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"PAY NOW, ARGUE LATER" RULE – BEFORE AND AFTER THE TAX 
ADMINISTRATION ACT 
 
C Keulder 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The levying of taxes is imperative for a government to ensure that it achieves its 
economic objectives1 which, amongst others, include the economic development of 
the country and regulating the levels of employment.2 The South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) is empowered to administer and collect taxes in South Africa,3 and 
value-added tax (VAT) is one of the forms of tax collected by SARS.4 
 
VAT is collected by registered vendors5 on the supply of goods and services in South 
Africa and on the importation of goods and services to South Africa.6 VAT is 
therefore concerned with the consumption of goods and services in South Africa.7 In 
terms of the VAT system, the vendor may deduct:8 
 
tax incurred on enterprise inputs (input tax) from the tax collected on 
supplies made by the enterprise (output tax). 
 
                                                 

 Carika Keulder. LLB (UP), LLM (UP). Lecturer, Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria. Email: 
carika.keulder@up.ac.za. 
1 CroomeTaxpayer's Rights 1. 
2 CroomeTaxpayer's Rights 3. 
3 Sections 3 and 4 of the South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997. 
4 Silver and Beneke VAT Handbook 3. Even though the "pay now, argue later" rule relates to all 
forms of tax, the focus in this article will be on VAT, because the application of the "pay now, 
argue later" rule is similar irrespective of the form of tax. 
5 Silver and Beneke VAT Handbook 13. S 1 of the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (hereafter "the 
VAT Act") indicates that a "vendor" is a person registered or obliged to be registered. S 23 of the 
VAT Act furthermore indicates that a person must register, or is obliged to register, when the 
total value of the taxable supplies made by a person who is carrying on an enterprise, exceeded 
R1 million during the 12-month period ending that month or where there are reasonable grounds 
for supposing that the taxable supplies will exceed R1 million in the next 12 months. See also 
Silver and Beneke VAT Handbook 157. 
6 Section 7 of the VAT Act. 
7 SARS Guide for Vendors 8. 
8 SARS Guide for Vendors 9. See Silver and Beneke VAT Handbook 15 for a discussion on input 
and output tax. 
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This has the effect that a vendor acts as an agent by collecting tax on behalf of the 
government9 and paying the balance, being the difference between the input and 
output tax, over to SARS.10 This balance is calculated by means of self-assessment.11 
It is, however, possible that SARS may furnish the vendor with an assessment when 
a taxpayer does not furnish a return as required or if SARS is not satisfied with the 
furnished return.12 
 
If a taxpayer is aggrieved by an assessment issued by SARS, the taxpayer may lodge 
an objection to the assessment.13 The commissioner may then either alter the 
assessment or disallow the objection14 and inform the taxpayer of the decision.15 
 
Thereafter, if the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the commissioner's decision, he or she 
may appeal against the decision.16 After an appeal is lodged, the dispute can be 
referred to alternative dispute resolution (ADR), the Tax Board or the Tax Court.17 
 
Owing to SARS's duty to collect tax, it is afforded certain powers by the legislature to 
effect efficient and speedy collection of taxes18 and restrict the ability of taxpayers to 
use the objection or appeal procedures to vexatiously delay the payment of their 
taxes.19 One of these powers is the "pay now, argue later" rule. The "pay now, 
argue later" rule was provided for in terms of section 36 of the VAT Act20 and is 
currently provided for in terms of section 164 of the Tax Administration Act.21 
 
                                                 
9 SARS Guide for Vendors 8. 
10 SARS Guide for Vendors 55. 
11 Silver and Beneke VAT Handbook 205. 
12 Sections 31(1)(a) and (b) of the VAT Act. S 31(1) stipulates other circumstances when SARS can 
issue an assessment. For the purposes of this article s 31(1)(a) and (b) are of relevance. 
13 Section 32(b) of the VAT Act. 
14 Section 31(4) of the VAT Act. 
15 Section 31(4) of the VAT Act. 
16 Section 33(1) of the VAT Act. S 33(1) furthermore states that time periods prescribed in s 107A 
relating to appeals will also apply to appeals in terms of the VAT Act. 
17 See s 33, 33A of the VAT Act and SARS Dispute Resolution 13. 
18 Muller Wealth Transfer 63. 
19 Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 2011 ZAWCHC 297 para 9 – hereafter "Capstone". 
20 Hereafter referred to as "the section 36 rule". 
21 Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 – hereafter "the TAA". 
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In accordance with the "pay now, argue later" rule, a taxpayer who disputes the 
assessed amount payable to SARS will still be obliged to pay this amount – even 
though an objection to the assessment has been lodged. This obligation is 
furthermore not suspended when an appeal against a disallowance is lodged.22 
 
If section 34 of the Constitution,23 which affords every person the right of access to 
court, is borne in mind, the question arises whether this rule is constitutional or not, 
as it seems not to allow access to the court before payment is made.24 On the other 
hand, if the "pay now, argue later" rule were not implemented by SARS, there would 
be an incentive for a taxpayer to dispute an assessment, which the taxpayer would 
not otherwise have done.25 This might lead to frivolous objections26 which could 
cause SARS and the South African government to experience dire financial 
constraints. 
 
It is therefore clear that a balance between a taxpayer's rights and SARS's duty to 
effectively collect tax must be achieved. In the matter of Metcash Trading Ltd v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service,27 the Constitutional Court held 
that such a balance had in fact been achieved and thus declared the "pay now, 
argue later" rule relating to VAT to be constitutionally sound. In view of the principle 
of stare decisis,28 this Constitutional Court decision is binding on all courts, unless it 
can be shown that the court erred.29 
 
                                                 
22 Section 105 of the TAA, which was promulgated on 4 July 2012, provides that the "pay now, 
argue later" rule is applicable to an objection to an assessment and the lodging of an appeal 
against the disallowance of an objection. The Act will come into operation on a date to be 
determined by the president by proclamation in the Government Gazette, as indicated in s 272 of 
the Act. See Pato and Spira 2009 www.saica.co.za on the amendments of s 88 of the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962, which section is similar to s 36 of the VAT Act. 
23 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 – hereafter "the Constitution". 
24 See 2.4.2 herein. 
25 Arnold Opinion. 
26 Arnold Opinion. 
27 Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2001 1 BCLR 1 (CC) 
– hereafter "Metcash Trading Ltd (CC)". 
28 See Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal System 213 for a discussion regarding the authority 
given to past judgments. 
29 Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1997 1 
BCLR 1 (CC) para 8. 
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Despite the fact that the section 36 rule has been found to be constitutionally sound, 
the present article argues that it poses some constitutional and other problems, and, 
accordingly, that there might be sufficient grounds for the courts to deviate from this 
precedent. The article further discusses whether the section 164 rule corrects the 
constitutional problems experienced with the section 36 rule. 
 
In order to fully appreciate the section 164 rule, it is essential to discuss in detail the 
section 36 rule and the effect thereof. Firstly, the contextual setting of the section 36 
rule is explored, and, thereafter the constitutionality of the section 36 rule is 
investigated. This investigation is conducted with specific reference to Metcash 
Trading Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service,30 in which the 
courts had to deal with a constitutional attack on section 36 of the VAT Act. 
 
After the discussion of the section 36 rule, the focus of this article will shift to the 
section 164 rule. Here it will be determined whether the section 164 rule addresses 
the problems experienced with the section 36 rule. 
 
2 Section 36 rule 
 
2.1 Content 
 
Section 36 states that the payment of tax will not be suspended pending an 
objection or an appeal unless the commissioner directs otherwise.31 A taxpayer 
desiring suspension of the payment of tax can, however, request a suspension.32 
 
The commissioner can deny a taxpayer's request, or revoke the decision to suspend 
the payment of tax, if he or she is satisfied that the objection or appeal is frivolous, 
                                                 
30 Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2002 2 SA 232 (W) – 
hereafter "Metcash Trading Ltd (W)". 
31 Section 36(1) of the VAT Act. 
32 Section 36(2) of the VAT Act. See 2.4.4.1 herein regarding factors that the commissioner may 
consider in deciding whether to grant a suspension or not. These factors were inserted by way of 
the Taxation Laws Second Amendment Act 18 of 2009 – hereafter "the TLSA". 
C KEULDER                                                                         PER / PELJ 2013(16)4 
 
 
129 / 487 
is being used as a dilatory tactic or because material changes have occurred since 
the suspension was granted.33 
 
It must be noted that in the event of the objection or appeal being successful an 
adjustment, including interest,34 will be made.35 Even though the payment of 
interest is to be welcomed,36 it must be pointed out that this may not prevent the 
taxpayer from experiencing financial ruin if he or she has to pay the assessed 
amount pending an appeal.37 
 
2.2 Contextual setting 
 
In order to appreciate the extent of the section 36 rule, the context in which the 
"pay now, argue later" rule is applied must be considered, as the "pay now, argue 
later" rule is not applied in isolation. The consequences if a taxpayer fails to pay the 
assessed amount pending an objection or an appeal are relevant, as SARS is 
afforded further powers to enforce the collection of taxes due. 
 
If the taxpayer does not honour his or her obligation to pay tax pending an objection 
or an appeal against a disallowance, SARS may, firstly, implement the statement 
procedure as provided for in section 40(2)(a) of the VAT Act.38 
 
In terms of this procedure, the commissioner may file a statement indicating the 
outstanding tax, interest or penalty payable, with the clerk or registrar of a 
                                                 
33 Section 36(4) of the VAT Act. 
34 See SARS 2011 www.sars.gov.za regarding the interest rates. 
35 Section 36(5) of the VAT Act. In these circumstances, SARS will issue a revised assessment. 
36 Temkin 2012 www.businessday.co.za. 
37 Tsikwe and Schultz 2011 www.saica.co.za. 
38 Section 91(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and s 114(1)(a)(ii) of the Customs Act 90 of 
1964 contain a similar provision. 
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competent court. The filing of the statement has the effect of a civil judgment,39 
which enables the commissioner to obtain a writ to attach and sell property.40 
 
Secondly, SARS may appoint a third party to act as an agent for the taxpayer. This 
third party would then be required to make payment of taxes from money held by 
the third party on behalf of the taxpayer.41 
 
In the matter of Hindry v Nedcor Bank Ltd,42 the constitutionality of appointing a 
third party as an agent of a taxpayer was tested.43 Wush J44 held that the 
appointment of a taxpayer's agent is necessary for the speedy collection of taxes, 
and as a weapon of great importance to the state, and consequently declared the 
appointment of a taxpayer's agent constitutional. 
 
Consequently, a taxpayer's failure to pay tax pending an objection or an appeal 
against a disallowance may result in SARS obtaining a civil judgment or ordering a 
third party to act as an agent of the taxpayer. The "pay now, argue later" rule, on its 
own, does not guarantee the effective collection of taxes but the enforcement 
procedures are such that SARS is assured of effectively collecting taxes. 
 
The need for SARS to be able to collect taxes efficiently and effectively is freely 
acknowledged, but it is important that a taxpayer's constitutional rights as a 
taxpayer should also be considered. 
 
                                                 
39 Section 40(2)(a) of the VAT Act. See Brincker and Louw Date Unknown www.saipa.co.za and 
Silke 2002 Acta Juridica 282-334, 293, regarding the filing of a statement by SARS. 
40 Capstone para 37. In Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 1138, the court held the statement procedure to 
be constitutional, as the execution of the civil judgment necessitates the intervention of court 
officials. Accordingly a taxpayer's right of access to the courts remains intact. 
41 Section 47 of the VAT Act. 
42 Hindry v Nedcor Bank Ltd 1999 2 All SA 38 (W) − hereafter "Hindry". See Silke 2002 Acta 
Juridica 304, and Olivier and Croome Tax Administration 233, for a further discussion of the 
Hindry decision. 
43 The Hindry decision dealt with the appointment of a taxpayer's agent in terms of s 99 of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. The wording of s 99 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and s 47 of 
the VAT Act is similar, however. 
44 Hindry 63. See Van Schalkwyk 2004 Meditari Accountancy Research 185, 195. 
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2.3 A taxpayer's right of access to the courts 
 
With the enactment of the Interim Constitution45 and the Constitution, South Africa 
changed from a parliamentary state46 to a constitutional state.47 As a constitutional 
state, where the Constitution is supreme, anyone may challenge the constitutionality 
of any conduct or law.48 This principle is enshrined in section 34 of the Constitution, 
which provides as follows:49 
 
Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum. 
 
This section guarantees the right of access to a court or other tribunal, the right to a 
fair public hearing,50 and impartiality and independence by the tribunal or forum.51 
Ackermann J in Bernstein v Bester52 correctly held that an object of this right was, 
amongst others, "the separation of the judiciary from the other arms of the state". 
 
In Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank,53 the court indicated that another 
object of section 34 is to ensure a peaceful and orderly society "without resorting to 
self-help". The court further elaborated by stating that "no one is entitled to take the 
law into her or his own hands".54 
 
                                                 
45 Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
46 In a parliamentary state, parliament has the power to enact any law, whilst no one, including the 
courts, has the authority to challenge the law. See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights 3. 
47 See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights 11. 
48 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights 704. S 1(c) of the Constitution confirms that South Africa is a 
constitutional state, as it indicates that South Africa is founded on the supremacy of the 
Constitution. 
49 Section 34 of the Constitution. 
50 The right ensures that "due process" is followed. See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights 704. This 
right can also be linked to the right to administrative justice enshrined in s 33 of the 
Constitution. 
51 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights 704. 
52 Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) 804. 
53 Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank 1999 12 BCLR 1420 (CC) 1429 – hereafter "Chief 
Lesapo". 
54 Chief Lesapo 1436. 
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The fact that the right of access to the court protects against self-help is further 
supported by Cheadle, Davis and Haysom, and by Jazbhay, who are of the opinion 
that self-help contravenes the right of access to the courts.55 Jazbhay furthermore 
indicates that this concept of self-help could be described as becoming a judge in a 
matter to which one is a party.56  
 
In Chief Lesapo57 the court emphasised that section 34 of the Constitution is of great 
importance to prevent self-help and "[a]s a result, very powerful considerations 
would be required for its limitation to be reasonable".58 
 
Would SARS's duty to effect the speedy collection of tax therefore create a powerful 
consideration such as was envisaged by the court in Chief Lesapo? This article will 
now deal with the constitutionality of the section 36 rule, with specific reference to 
Metcash Trading Ltd.59 
 
2.4 Constitutional attack 
 
2.4.1  General principles 
 
It is necessary to focus briefly on some general principles relating to constitutional 
evaluation. 
 
The right of access to the courts contained in the Bill of Rights is not absolute and 
may, in accordance with section 36 of the Constitution, be limited if the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable. The application of section 36 can be divided into two 
stages. 
 
                                                 
55 Cheadle, Davis and Haysom Constitutional Law 620; Jazbhay 2000 www.legalcity.net. 
56 Jazbhay 2000 www.legalcity.net. 
57 Chief Lesapo 1429. 
58 The reasonable limitation indicated by the court refers to the fact that, in terms of s 36 of the 
Constitution, a right may be limited if the limitation is reasonable. See 2.4.1 herein. 
59 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) and Metcash Trading Ltd (CC). 
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Firstly, it must be proved by the applicant – in this instance, a taxpayer – that a 
constitutional right has been limited.60 This would require the person to show that 
the situation for which he or she seeks constitutional protection falls within the ambit 
of the particular constitutional right,61 and that the right or practice he or she wishes 
to challenge impedes the exercise of the protected activity.62 Only then will the court 
move to the second stage. 
 
In this instance (namely that of a taxpayer), an assessed amount that has been 
questioned, either by way of objection or appeal, will still be due and payable and 
SARS's right to recover the money from the taxpayer will not be stayed. It seems 
that a taxpayer's right against self-help, as embodied in section 34 of the 
Constitution, will be restricted by the application of the section 36 rule, as SARS can 
enforce the statement procedure or declare a third party an agent of the taxpayer. 
The court will therefore be able to move on to the second stage. 
 
The second stage examines whether the limitation is a reasonable and justifiable 
limitation based on the concepts of human dignity, equality and freedom.63 In order 
to ascertain whether or not the limitation is reasonable and justifiable, the court 
must consider the nature and extent of the limitation, the importance of the purpose 
of the limitation, as well as the relation between the limitation and the said purpose. 
Furthermore, the court must consider if there are less invasive means available, and 
must also consider the nature of the right that is being limited.64 
 
If it is a reasonable and justifiable limitation, the impediment will be allowed. In the 
event that it is not reasonable and justifiable, the practice will be unconstitutional. 
 
Section 36 of the Constitution sets out factors which the court has to take into 
consideration when determining if a limitation is reasonable and justifiable. These 
                                                 
60 Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 34-4. 
61 Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 34-4. 
62 Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 34-5. 
63 Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
64 Section 36(1)(a)-(e) of the Constitution. 
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factors must not be seen as comprising a check list, but rather as part of a balancing 
act.65 When weighing up these factors, the following dictum must be kept in mind:66 
 
[T]he Court places the purpose, effects and importance of the infringing 
legislation on one side of the scales and the nature and effect of the 
infringement caused by the legislation on the other. 
 
When a court has to deal with the constitutionality of the section 36 rule, it will have 
to weigh the purpose, effect and importance of the "pay now, argue later" rule 
against the nature and effect of this rule on a person's right of access to the courts. 
 
The purpose of the "pay now, argue later rule" is to effect the speedy collection of 
taxes.67 These taxes are used to improve the country's economic development and 
to regulate levels of employment.68 With the "pay now, argue later" rule, SARS can 
reduce the number of frivolous objections and guarantee that the treasury will not 
be prejudiced by a delay in payments.69 On the other side of the scale will be the 
impact of the "pay now, argue later" rule on the right of access to the courts, as the 
taxpayer is prima facie obliged to pay the assessed amount before approaching the 
court. 
 
The Metcash Trading Ltd judgment is now discussed with these general principles in 
mind. 
 
2.4.2  Metcash Trading Ltd 
 
2.4.2.1 Facts 
 
SARS served an assessment in the amount of R266 million, in terms of section 31(1) 
of the VAT Act, on the applicant.70 The applicant objected to this assessment, but 
                                                 
65 S v Manamela 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) 19. 
66 S v Bhulwana 1995 ZACC 11. 
67 Muller Wealth Transfer 63. 
68 CroomeTaxpayer's Rights 3. 
69 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 29. 
70 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 320. This amount included penalties, additional tax and interest. 
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the objection was disallowed by SARS.71 The applicant was also notified that, if he 
did not effect payment, SARS would implement its summary procedure.72 
 
Metcash, in response, approached the High Court on an urgent basis. A consent 
order was granted to the effect that the applicant must lodge an application before a 
specific date to have sections 36, 40(2)(a) and 40(5) of the VAT Act declared 
contrary to sections 25(1) and 34 of the Constitution.73 SARS undertook not to 
enforce the summary procedure before the specific date. 
 
2.4.2.2 Court a quo 
 
The question before the court a quo was whether sections 36, 40(2)(a) and 40(5) of 
the VAT Act were in conflict with sections 25(1) and 34 of the Constitution. The 
applicant did not pursue any argument regarding the possible infringement of a 
person's right to property as contained in section 25(1) of the Constitution.74 
Accordingly, the court had to deal only with the effect that the sections of the VAT 
Act had on a person's right of access to the courts. 
 
In her judgment Snyders J75 referred to Chief Lesapo and stipulated that the 
infringement of a constitutional right cannot be justified by the merits of a specific 
case. The test is therefore objective. Snyders J76 held that the summary procedure 
does infringe on a taxpayer's right of access to the courts, as SARS acts as a 
substitute for the court by determining every aspect of the vendor's liability and 
enforcement thereof. Further, she held that all interlocutory relief by the court is 
precluded by this section.77 She elaborated by stating that:78 
                                                 
71 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 321. 
72 As contained in s 40(2) of the VAT Act. S 91(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 contains a 
similar provision. The statement procedure forms part of the summary procedure. See 2.2 herein 
for a discussion of the statement procedure. 
73 Metcash Trading Ltd (W). For the purposes of this article, the focus is on the "pay now, argue 
later" rule contained in s 36 of the VAT Act. 
74 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 322. 
75 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 322. 
76 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 327. 
77 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 327. 
78 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 327. 
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[t]he prospect that an eventual successful appeal might reverse the situation 
is no answer to the actual infringement which endures until then. 
 
Accordingly, the first stage of the constitutional evaluation was successful and the 
court moved on to examine whether the said infringement was reasonable and 
justifiable. 
 
The commissioner argued that a reasonable and justifiable limitation was created for 
the following reasons, amongst others: 
 
 frivolous objections would be made to delay the payment of taxes; 
 fraudulent and dishonest tax returns would be encouraged; 
 South Africa could not afford a situation where taxpayers do not pay 
promptly.79 
 
The court held that a delay in casu would not have such a big impact, considering 
the greater scheme of national tax.80 It was further held that the limitation of a 
person's right of access to the court was extensive and that, even though it might be 
only temporary in nature, the effect could be ominous and permanent.81 The 
limitation was accordingly held not to be reasonable and justifiable. 
 
The statement procedure,82 the "pay now, argue later" rule83 and denial of the right 
to challenge the correctness of the assessed amount on the statement84 were 
consequently declared invalid in the court a quo and the matter was referred to the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation.85 
                                                 
79 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 327. 
80 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 328. 
81 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 328. 
82 Section 40(2) of the VAT Act. 
83 Section 36 of the VAT Act. 
84 Section 40(5) of the VAT Act. 
85 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 330. In terms of s 167(5) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
has to confirm an order declaring legislation invalid before the order comes into effect. See also 
Editor February 2000 Taxgram 1-3; Silke 2002 Acta Juridica 310; Olivier 2001 TSAR 194; Vorster 
2001 De Rebus 47-47; Moodley Date Unknown nattymoodley.com; Olivier and Croome Tax 
Administration 223. 
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2.4.2.3 Constitutional Court 
 
The minister of finance and the commissioner for SARS opposed confirmation of the 
order granted in the court a quo.86 They argued that the limitation was reasonable 
and justifiable as there were adequate opportunities for a taxpayer to have a hearing 
on the assessment.87 
 
Metcash supported the ruling and reasoning of Snyders J in the court a quo.88 It 
contended that the opportunities for a "hearing" on the assessment referred to by 
the respondent were insufficient, as the taxpayer was in effect compelled to pay and 
hope that he or she would get the money back at a later stage.89 The applicant 
submitted that there were less invasive means available to SARS to effect the 
speedy collection of taxes.90 These means included the imposition of higher interest 
rates, time-linked penalties and the furnishing of security.91 
 
The court indicated that section 36(1) had two objectives, namely to ensure that the 
obligation of an aggrieved taxpayer to pay tax not be delayed pursuant to other 
remedies, and secondly that the necessary refunds be made later.92 Kriegler J 
therefore held that the "pay now, argue later" rule was not concerned with access to 
the court and contained no provision ousting the court's jurisdiction.93 He further 
elaborated on the functioning of the Special Tax Court and the fact that it functions 
like an ordinary court. The taxpayer would therefore have access to the courts by 
appealing to the Special Tax Court.94 
 
                                                 
86 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 6. 
87 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 6. These opportunities would entail the following: an objection to the 
assessment; requesting an extension to pay from the commissioner; if the commissioner refuses 
said extension, taking the matter on review by a relevant court; as well as appealing to the 
Special Tax Court. 
88 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 7. 
89 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 7. 
90 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 7. 
91 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 329. 
92 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 7. 
93 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 18. See 4.2.4 herein for criticism of this point of view. 
94 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 25. See 4.2.4 herein for criticism regarding Kriegler's decision relating 
to the court's jurisdiction being ousted. 
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The court agreed with the commissioner that, in exercising his or her discretion in 
terms of section 36(1) of the VAT Act, his or her conduct constitutes administrative 
action which would be reviewable in terms of administrative law.95 It was concluded 
that the court a quo had thus erred in holding that the court's jurisdiction was 
ousted.96 In a unanimous decision, the Constitutional Court dashed the aggrieved 
taxpayer's hope by refusing to declare sections 36, 40(2)(a) and 40(5) 
unconstitutional.97 
 
The court therefore held the section 36 rule to be constitutional, and furthermore 
held that this rule constitutes administrative action. The fact that the "pay now, 
argue later" rule constitutes administrative action means that a taxpayer may also 
utilise the review procedure98 provided for by the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act99 when dissatisfied with an assessment. Since the court held the "pay now, 
argue later" rule to be unconstitutional, utilising the review procedure might seem to 
be an alternative for an aggrieved taxpayer.100 
 
2.4.3  Constitutional problems 
 
Vorster101 correctly speculates that opinions may differ on the question of whether or 
not the judgment in Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) was correct. For the purposes of this 
article, two conflicting opinions are highlighted. 
 
Croome agrees with the judgment and states that the fact that the taxpayer may 
approach a court on review of the matter ensures that the taxpayer has a right of 
access to the court.102 He is further of the opinion that section 88 of the Income Tax 
                                                 
95 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 21. See Burns Administrative Law 19; Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 4; 
and De Ville Judicial Review 38 for a discussion of "administrative action". 
96 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 22. 
97 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 33. See also Editor December 2000 Taxgram 1-2; Editor February 
2001 Taxgram 1-4. 
98 Moodley Date Unknown nattymoodley.com. 
99 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 – hereafter "PAJA". 
100 See 2.4.3 herein, where Olivier indicates that the fact that review proceedings are an option 
does not mean that a provision can be constitutional. 
101 Vorster 2001 De Rebus 47. 
102 CroomeTaxpayer's Rights 40. 
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Act, which contains a similar provision, would also muster constitutional scrutiny.103 
Williams,104 however, submits that it is not a foregone conclusion that the court 
would have come to the same conclusion in Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) had it been an 
income tax matter. This is because the court in Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) specifically 
drew a clear distinction between income tax and VAT and emphasised that the 
matter before it dealt with VAT and no other fiscal statute.105 Firstly, the court 
indicated that VAT liability arises continuously, unlike income tax liability, which 
arises once an assessment has been issued.106 Secondly, and more importantly, 
vendors act as collection agents on behalf of SARS;107 hence VAT is money collected 
that is due to the state.108 The calculation of VAT payments is therefore less 
complicated than that in respect of income tax.109 This means that, in the case of 
income tax, the scope for conflict regarding the interpretation of the statute or 
accounting practices is far greater.110 A dispute regarding a VAT assessment will 
often arise owing to adverse credibility findings by SARS.111 
 
It is submitted that the Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) judgment was concerned only with 
the application of the "pay now, argue later" rule in relation to VAT and has no 
binding effect on other tax legislation. The considerations that influenced the court 
in arriving at this decision in relation to VAT would not necessarily lead to the same 
conclusion in relation to income tax matters. 
 
On the other hand, unlike Croome, Olivier is of the opinion that the Constitutional 
Court erred on several counts in its judgment. 
 
                                                 
103 CroomeTaxpayer's Rights 226. See also Croome 2001 Business Day Professional 6-6. 
104  Williams 2012 Synopsis 4–4. 
105 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 9, 10, 13. See also Olivier and Croome Tax Administration 224. 
106 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 9. 
107 See 1 herein. 
108  Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 10. 
109 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 13. See 1 herein for an explanation of the VAT calculation.  
110 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 13. See also Williams 2012 Synopsis 4-5. 
111 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 13. 
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Firstly, she criticises Kriegler's view that the section 36 rule does not oust the 
jurisdiction of the court as a taxpayer may appeal to the Special Tax Court.112 She 
indicates that the taxpayer never argued that the jurisdiction of the court is 
completely excluded, but that this rule excludes the jurisdiction of the court when 
the rule is invoked.113 
 
On the basis of Olivier's criticism, it is submitted that the constitutional attack on the 
section 36 rule lies therein that the right of access to the courts, as contained in 
section 34 of the Constitution, aims to prevent self-help. The court should thus have 
examined whether this rule, at the time it is invoked, unreasonably permits SARS to 
"help itself" and become the judge in its own case. The question, therefore, should 
not be whether the taxpayer will have access to the courts at some stage, but rather 
whether the taxpayer will have the opportunity to access the courts before being 
obliged to pay the assessed amount. 
 
Olivier further points out that, in theory, the possible judicial review of the 
commissioner's discretion not to suspend a taxpayer's payment pending an appeal 
does allow a taxpayer access to the courts, but, according to her, the grounds of 
review are fairly narrow.114 
 
It must also be borne in mind that the remedies available when a court reviews the 
commissioner's discretion not to suspend payment are limited. In terms of section 8 
of PAJA, the court can grant an order directing the commissioner to provide reasons 
or reconsider the decision. However, the court does not have the power to overturn 
the commissioner's decision. 
 
The value of the review procedure is further diminished when the statement 
procedure in terms of section 40(2)(a) of the VAT Act is invoked,115 as the taxpayer 
                                                 
112 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 18, 25. See also 4.2.3 herein. 
113 Olivier 2001 TSAR 196. 
114 Olivier 2001 TSAR 197. Unfortunately, it is not clear to the present writer what the basis of this 
statement by Olivier is. 
115 See 2.2 herein regarding the statement procedure. 
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may then not challenge the correctness of the statement in legal proceedings.116, 117 
With reference to the review procedure, Olivier also refers to Dawood v Minister of 
Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home 
Affairs118 where it was held that:119 
 
the exercise of a discretionary power may subsequently be successfully 
challenged on administrative grounds, for example that it was not 
reasonable, does not relieve the legislature of its constitutional obligation to 
promote, protect and fulfil the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
 
Therefore, there is still a duty on the legislature to ensure that provisions are 
constitutional, even though a decision can be taken on review. 
 
Olivier also submits that, in both the High Court and the Constitutional Court, it was 
said on behalf of the respondents that this practice was implemented in other 
countries.120 Snyders J, in the High Court, held that this did not persuade her that 
the South African provision is constitutional.121 The Constitutional Court, however, 
came to a different conclusion.122 It is unclear which countries served, or did not 
serve, as examples of this practice.123 
 
Olivier furthermore indicates that, if legislation defined the grounds on which the 
commissioner would exercise his or her discretion to suspend payment pending an 
appeal, a person's right of access to the courts would be better protected.124 
 
                                                 
116 Section 40(5) of the VAT Act. 
117 Olivier 2001 TSAR 198. See also Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 27 where the court discussed the 
limitation of the nature of the relief afforded to the taxpayer due to s 40(5) of the VAT Act. 
118 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2000 8 BCR 837 (CC); Olivier 2001 TSAR 197. 
119 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2000 8 BCR 837 (CC) para 48. 
120 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 329 and Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 30. 
121 Metcash Trading Ltd (W) 329. 
122 Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 30. 
123 Olivier 2001 TSAR 199. 
124 Olivier 2001 TSAR 199. See 2.4.4.1 herein for a discussion on the guidelines used by the 
commissioner when exercising his or her discretion in terms of the "pay now, argue later" rule. 
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She concludes that the court did not deal with the argument raised by the applicant 
that there are less invasive ways to effect speedy collection of tax.125 The possibility 
that there are less invasive ways to for SARS to achieve its objective is one of the 
factors the court would have had to consider in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution. 
 
2.4.4  Post Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) 
 
2.4.4.1 Guidelines 
 
After the Constitutional Court judgment, SARS issued Media Release 27. This release 
set out the circumstances in which the commissioner may exercise his or her 
discretion in suspending payment pending an appeal that might be decided in favour 
of the taxpayer. One such example was when payment of the whole amount would 
cause irreversible damage if the taxpayer's appeal were successful, and where the 
circumstances of the matter created reasonable doubt.126 
 
The TLSA has further clarified the "pay now, argue later" rule by amending section 
88 of the Income Tax Act and section 36 of the VAT Act.127 The sections were 
amended to set out the factors that the commissioner may take into consideration 
when exercising his or her discretion to suspend a payment pending an appeal, and 
include the following: 
 
 the amount involved; 
 the taxpayer's compliance history; 
 whether the taxpayer might alienate his or her assets during the 
postponement of payment; 
 whether the taxpayer is able to provide adequate security for the payment of 
the assessed amount; 
                                                 
125 Olivier 2001 TSAR 199. This is one of the aspects the court has to take into consideration when 
weighing up rights in terms of s 36 of the Constitution. See 2.4.1 herein. 
126 See SARS Media Release. 
127 See Magolego 2009 www.polity.org.za. 
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 whether payment of the amount would cause irreparable financial hardship to 
the taxpayer; 
 whether there are impending sequestration or liquidation proceedings; 
 whether the taxpayer has failed to furnish requested information; and 
 whether fraud is present.128 
 
The guidelines provided after the decision in Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) assist in 
ensuring some legal certainty regarding whether a taxpayer would have to pay now 
and argue later or whether payment should be suspended pending an appeal.129 
 
2.4.4.2 Guideline problems 
 
"[O]n-going confusion and misunderstandings" still persist, however, regarding the 
section 36 rule.130 Rood131 indicates that the commissioner is still the judge in a 
dispute to which he or she is a party. This means that SARS, as a party to the 
dispute, can decide whether the taxpayer may, for instance, possibly alienate assets 
and, if it is of the opinion that the taxpayer will alienate assets, can then proceed 
accordingly with collection proceedings.132 
 
He furthermore indicates that it is unclear whether the fraud referred 
to in the amended section refers only to alleged fraud or to an actual 
fraud conviction. If an allegation of fraud is taken into consideration, 
this would be unfair, as the taxpayer will not have had the opportunity 
to defend himself or herself against the allegation. 
 
                                                 
128 Section 88 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and s 36 of the VAT Act. See also SARS Date 
Unknown www.sars.gov.za; Pato and Spira 2009 www.saica.co.za; Croome 2011 
www.bericcroome.com; Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs 2009 www.saica.co.za; Goldberg De Villiers 
2012 www.goldbergdevilliers.co.za; Mukuwane Date Unknown www.belldewar.co.za; Daya and 
Gers 2011 www.ens.co.za; Sapa 2011 mybroadband.co.za; and Williams 2012 Synopsis 6. 
129 See 2.4.3 herein where Olivier indicates that a taxpayer's rights would be better protected if the 
grounds on which the commissioner may decide to suspend payment pending an appeal or an 
objection were identified. 
130 Williams 2012 Synopsis 5. 
131 Rood 2009 Finweek 44. 
132 Rood 2009 Finweek 44. 
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The Act is furthermore silent as to the relative weight which should be attached to 
each of the above factors.133 Moreover, the relevance of some of the factors is 
questionable.134 For instance, is the fact that a large amount of tax is involved an 
indication that suspension of payment should be granted or refused?135 The 
relevance of the possibility that the payment of the amount would cause irreparable 
financial hardship to the taxpayer is doubted by Williams, who thinks that the 
payment of any amount would be reparable by a damages award.136 This might, 
however, not be the case when a taxpayer is rendered insolvent. The objection and 
appeal procedure may take a substantial amount of time, which could severely 
prejudice a taxpayer and even lead to the taxpayer's sequestration or liquidation. 
 
In Mokoena v CSARS137 and Capstone, the respective courts came to entirely 
different conclusions on a pertinent aspect of the rule.138 In the former case the 
court held that while SARS is competent to demand payment of tax pending an 
objection or appeal based on the "pay now, argue later" rule it may not obtain 
judgment in the interim.139 This decision was criticised in Capstone, as the filing of a 
statement does not amount to a judgment.140 Binns-Ward J conceded that, even 
though it is not a judgment in the ordinary sense, it has the effect of a judgment, as 
SARS is able to obtain a writ of execution.141 
 
It is apparent that, even though the "pay now, argue later" rule in terms of the 
section 36 rule was held to be constitutional and further guidelines were provided, 
the application of the "pay now, argue later" rule is still problematic. 
 
With the enactment of the TAA, the "pay now, argue later" rule is provided for in 
terms of section 164 of the TAA. This article will now proceed to focus on the "pay 
                                                 
133 Williams 2012 Synopsis 6. 
134 Williams 2012 Synopsis 6. 
135 Williams 2012 Synopsis 6. 
136 Williams 2012 Synopsis 6. 
137 Mokoena v CSARS 2011 2 SA 556 (GSJ) – hereafter "Mokoena". 
138 Williams 2012 Synopsis 5. 
139 Mokoena 559. The "judgment" referred to here is the filing of a statement in terms of s 40(2)(a) 
of the VAT Act. See 2.2 herein for a discussion of the statement procedure. 
140 Capstone 297 para 37. 
141 Capstone 297 para 37. 
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now, argue later" rule in terms of the TAA, and will attempt to determine if the 
problems experienced with the section 36 rule are addressed by the section 164 
rule. 
 
3 Section 164 rule 
 
3.1 The TAA 
 
The legislature began drafting the TAA in 2005142 and it came into operation on 1 
October 2012.143 This act aims to "provide for the effective and efficient collection of 
tax".144 It is therefore clear that the TAA was enacted to assist SARS in its duty to 
collect tax. This is achieved, amongst other ways, by "aligning the administration of 
the tax Acts".145 
 
If a taxpayer is liable for the payment of tax in terms of a provision in a tax act, for 
instance the VAT Act, the tax administration will be done in terms of the TAA, except 
if the TAA is silent with regard to the administration in that instance.146 
 
The TAA specifically deals with the situation of the payment of tax pending an 
objection or an appeal. Accordingly, since 1 October 2012 the "pay now, argue later" 
rule will be dealt with in terms of section 164 of the TAA. 
 
3.2 Content 
 
Section 164 of the TAA stipulates that the obligation of a taxpayer to pay tax will not 
be suspended pending an objection or an appeal unless a senior SARS official 
indicates otherwise.147 A taxpayer can request a senior SARS official to suspend the 
                                                 
142 Vanek 2012 www.moneywebtax.co.za. 
143 In terms of s 272 of the TAA, the president determined, by means of Proc 51 in GG 35687, that 
the TAA, except for certain provisions, would come into operation on 1 October 2012. 
144 Section 2 of the TAA. 
145 Section 2(a) of the TAA. 
146 Sections 4(1) and 4(2) of the TAA. If the TAA is silent with regard to the administration in a 
specific instance, the provisions of the relevant tax act will apply. 
147 Section 164(1) of the TAA. 
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payment if the taxpayer intends to lodge an objection or an appeal against an 
assessment.148 The official will take into consideration the amount involved, the 
taxpayer's compliance history, whether the taxpayer might alienate his or her assets 
during the postponement of payment, the taxpayer's ability to furnish security, 
whether the payment pending an objection or an appeal would cause irreparable 
financial hardship, and if there are any imminent sequestration or liquidation 
proceedings pending. The official will also consider if the taxpayer has failed to 
furnish required information or if any fraud is involved.149 
 
A taxpayer's request may be denied or a suspension may be revoked if the objection 
is frivolous or is used by the taxpayer simply to delay the payment of tax. 
Furthermore, the suspension can be revoked if a material change has occurred since 
the official decided to suspend payment.150 
 
In terms of section 164(6), SARS is prohibited from invoking recovery proceedings 
for a period commencing on the day SARS receives a request for suspension, or a 
previously granted suspension is revoked, and ending ten business days after a 
notice of SARS's decision regarding suspension or revocation is issued. This means 
that, once the taxpayer has requested a suspension in terms of section 164(2), the 
enforcement proceedings151 are prohibited until ten days after SARS has delivered its 
decision to reject a suspension request or revoke a suspension. SARS is, however, 
permitted to continue with the collection procedures if it has a reasonable belief that 
the taxpayer may alienate assets.152 
 
In the event that an assessment is altered by SARS in accordance with an objection 
or an appeal, SARS will make a due adjustment.153 
 
                                                 
148 Section 164(2) of the TAA. 
149 Section 164(3) of the TAA. These factors mirror the guidelines enacted in terms of the TLSA. See 
2.4.4.1 herein. 
150 Section 164(5) of the TAA. 
151 These enforcement proceedings can include, amongst others, the statement procedure and the 
appointment of a taxpayer's agent. 
152 Section 164(6) of the TAA. 
153 Section 164(7) of the TAA. 
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Accordingly, the "pay now, argue later" rule will still be applied by SARS, but now in 
terms of section 164 of the TAA. The section indicates factors that a SARS official 
may consider in suspending the payment of tax pending an objection or an appeal. 
Nevertheless, the enforcement of the tax due to SARS is initially suspended until ten 
days after SARS has decided whether or not to suspend the payment of tax. 
 
3.3 Contextual setting 
 
As with the section 36 rule,154 the context in which the section 164 rule is applied is 
of importance. What, for instance, would the consequences be if the payment of tax 
pending an objection or an appeal were not suspended? 
 
Like the section 36 rule, the section 164 rule affords SARS further powers to enforce 
the collection of taxes due. These powers include, amongst others, the appointment 
of a third party as an agent of the taxpayer155 and the statement procedure.156 
Mention must also be made of the fact that section 172(2) specifically states that 
SARS may apply the statement procedure even though an objection or an appeal is 
lodged, unless a suspension has been granted. 
 
It is, therefore, important to note that, if a taxpayer's obligation to pay tax pending 
an objection or an appeal is not suspended, SARS can actively take steps to enforce 
the collection of tax. 
 
This leads one to ask if there are any substantive differences between the section 36 
rule and the section 164 rule. 
 
                                                 
154 See 2.1 herein. 
155 Section 179 of the TAA. This section is similar to the s 47 procedure in terms of the VAT Act. See 
2.2 herein for a brief discussion of this procedure. 
156 Section 172 of the TAA. This section is similar to the s 40(2)(a) procedure in terms of the VAT 
Act. See 2.2 herein for a brief discussion of this procedure. 
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3.4 Section 36 rule v section 164 rule 
 
Both rules provide for the practice of "pay now, argue later" and the wording of 
these two sections is similar. The section 164 rule deviates from the section 36 rule 
in only two respects. 
 
Firstly, in terms of the section 164 rule, a senior SARS official has the authority to 
suspend the payment of tax, whilst with the section 36 rule only the commissioner 
had this authority.157 
 
Secondly, section 164(6) of the TAA contains a unique section. In terms of this 
provision, SARS is prohibited from taking collection steps during the period of 
considering a suspension request and ten days after issuing a notice of denial or 
revocation of the suspension.158 
 
It needs to be determined whether these changes in terms of section 164(6) of the 
TAA address the problems identified regarding the "pay now, argue later" rule in 
terms of section 36 of the VAT Act.159 
 
3.5 Section 164 rule – addressing problems 
 
In the discussion on the constitutionality of the section 36 rule, certain problems 
were highlighted.160 Further problems were then identified with the section 36 rule in 
the discussion of the problems arising after Metcash Trading Ltd.161 
 
                                                 
157 See 2.1 and 3.2 herein. 
158 Except if SARS believes that the taxpayer might alienate assets. See 3.2 herein and Vanek 2012 
www.moneywebtax.co.za. 
159 See 2.4.3 and 2.4.4.2 herein. 
160 See 2.4.3 herein. 
161 See 2.4.4.2 herein. 
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3.5.1  The constitutional problems 
 
Olivier's main points of criticism levelled at the section 36 rule are, firstly, that, at the 
time the rule is invoked, the court's jurisdiction is excluded. The question that arises 
from this criticism is if SARS is unreasonably permitted to become the judge in its 
own case by being able to enforce its collection procedures despite an objection or 
an appeal being lodged.162 Secondly, Olivier indicates that there might be less 
invasive means available which will assist in achieving a balance between SARS's 
duty and the taxpayer's right of access to the courts.163 
 
The fact that section 164(1) allows for a senior SARS official, instead of the 
commissioner of SARS, to suspend the payment of tax pending an objection or an 
appeal only has the effect that the commissioner's powers are delegated. It does not 
address the problem that SARS is permitted to enforce the collection of tax even 
though an objection or an appeal has been lodged. Furthermore, authorising a 
senior SARS official to consider suspending the payment does not make the 
procedure less invasive if the request to have the payment suspended is rejected. 
Therefore, the first change in terms of the "pay now, argue later" rule will not have 
a significant impact on a taxpayer's right of access to the courts. 
 
The change in terms of section 164(6) of the TAA provides a taxpayer with a degree 
of legal certainty, because the taxpayer is guaranteed that SARS will not continue 
with any collection steps for a certain period, as the collection of tax is stayed for 
such a period. As a result, SARS will reach a decision regarding the request for 
suspending the payment pending an objection or an appeal as soon as possible to 
ensure that it can continue collecting tax rapidly. 
 
It follows that SARS will have an incentive to reach a swift decision, namely to be 
able to proceed with enforcement as soon as a request for suspension is rejected. 
This could result in senior SARS officials not taking into account all relevant 
                                                 
162 See 2.4.3 herein. 
163 See 2.4.3 herein. 
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considerations164 in determining whether payment pending an objection or an appeal 
should be suspended. If this is indeed the case, taxpayers will be forced to take 
these decisions on review.165 
 
Section 164(6) furthermore does not explore the fact that there might be less 
invasive means available. 
 
It appears that the change in terms of section 164(6) of the TAA does not assist in 
resolving any of the problems identified previously.166 
 
3.5.2  The guideline problems 
 
The guidelines provided for in terms of the TLSA were also criticised. The opinion 
was expressed that SARS acts as a judge in a matter to which it is a party. 
Furthermore, the weight, meaning and relevance of some of these factors were 
criticised.167 The guidelines provided for in terms of the TLSA are replicated in 
section 164(3) of the TAA. The criticism levelled at the section 36(3) factors will 
therefore still obtain in respect of the section 164 rule. Accordingly, the section 
164(3) rule does not address the problems identified previously.168 
 
The TAA does, however, address the confusion that arose in Mokoena regarding 
whether or not SARS may proceed with the collection of tax even though an 
objection or an appeal has been lodged. Section 172(2) of the TAA specifically states 
that SARS may proceed with the statement procedure even though an objection or 
an appeal is lodged, provided that the obligation has not been suspended in terms of 
section 164 of the TAA. It is therefore confirmed that SARS may proceed with the 
statement procedure if the payment of tax is not suspended. 
 
                                                 
164 In terms of s 6(e)(iii), this will constitute a ground for judicial review in terms of PAJA. 
165 See s 8 of PAJA and 2.4.2.4 herein for the remedies available when a matter is taken on review. 
166 See 2.4.2.4 herein. 
167 See 2.4.4.2 herein. 
168 See 2.4.4.2 herein. 
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4 Conclusion 
 
It was established, when examining the constitutionality of the "pay now, argue 
later" rule, that a balance has to be achieved between the speedy collection of taxes 
and the taxpayer's right to approach the court. The court held in Metcash Trading 
Ltd (CC) that this balance is in fact achieved and, accordingly, that the "pay now, 
argue later" rule is constitutional. 
 
Two issues must, however, be kept in mind. Firstly, Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) dealt 
with the "pay now, argue later" rule in terms of the VAT Act. Therefore it does not 
create a precedent regarding income tax matters. The court still needs to determine 
whether the "pay now, argue later" rule in income tax matters will muster 
constitutional scrutiny. 
 
Secondly, the courts will be bound by the Metcash Trading Ltd (CC) decision unless 
it can be shown that this decision was wrong. Numerous arguments made by Olivier 
may assist a taxpayer in proving that the court erred, in the Metcash Trading Ltd 
(CC) judgment, in declaring section 36 of the VAT Act to be constitutional. 
 
Since 1 October 2012, the "pay now, argue later" rule has, however, been provided 
for in terms of section 164 of the TAA. The question that arose was whether or not 
the problems identified with regard to the section 36 rule would be addressed by 
section 164 of the TAA. Owing to the fact that the wording is fairly similar to that of 
section 36 of the VAT Act, the section 164 rule does not address the problems. In 
fact, it is possible that the new rule may lead to other problems. 
 
It is thus submitted that the legislature has failed to make productive use of the 
opportunity to draft legislation that would achieve a balance between SARS's duty 
and a taxpayer's right of access to the courts. 
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